In U.S. maritime policy, few oversights have dragged on as long as the Department of Transportation’s failure to publish its annual survey of shipbuilding and repair facilities. This key report—meant to track the capacity and condition of private U.S. shipyards—last appeared in full detail in 2003. It did not return until May 2025, creating a gap of more than 20 years. This wasn’t a trivial administrative slip.
The absence left investors, policymakers, and industry leaders without reliable, up-to-date government data during a period of mounting global competition and domestic supply chain strains. Now, as efforts intensify to rebuild American shipbuilding for economic and national security reasons, the report’s reappearance offers a fresh starting point. The prolonged silence, however, highlights how steady policy neglect can quietly undermine a strategic industry over decades.
What the Report Provides—and Why Its Absence Mattered
The Report on Survey of U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Facilities, compiled by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), gathers detailed inputs from major private shipyards. It covers everything from vessel types built or repaired, maximum ship dimensions handled, berth lengths, and major infrastructure like dry docks and marine railways. Earlier versions, including the 2003 edition, mapped a shrinking sector—down to a handful of major active yards amid intense foreign competition.
After 2003, the dedicated annual survey stopped. MARAD continued other analyses, such as economic impact studies, but the facility-specific, consistent tracking vanished. Factors like limited resources, shifting priorities toward other transportation areas, and changing administrative focus allowed the gap to widen. Over those 21+ years, the U.S. maritime sector navigated recessions, post-9/11 security shifts, supply chain shocks, and renewed calls for industrial revival—without this foundational dataset.
The Real Cost: Stalled High-Value Investments
Without current, authoritative government data on shipyard capabilities and trends, major decisions stalled. Private capital hesitated on expansions, modernizations, and new projects. Dozens of multimillion-dollar initiatives—ranging from yard upgrades and equipment installations to specialized facilities for offshore wind support vessels or advanced commercial ships—were delayed or scrapped. Investors needed solid benchmarks to gauge demand, competition, and feasibility; the void created too much uncertainty.
Navy programs suffered indirect fallout. Submarine, frigate, and other vessel builds already faced workforce shortages, design issues, and fragmented supply chains. The lack of comprehensive shipyard data made long-term industrial base planning harder, contributing to repeated schedule slips and capacity constraints. In an industry built on decades-long horizons, missing this information froze momentum and limited economic gains.
The Jones Act: One More Hurdle in the Mix
Adding to the challenges is the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, widely called the Jones Act. It mandates that goods shipped between U.S. ports travel on American-built, -owned, -crewed, and -flagged vessels. The goal was to sustain domestic shipbuilding and a ready merchant marine for defense needs.
In reality, the restrictions raise costs by curbing competition and requiring pricier U.S.-built ships. Domestic coastal shipping rates often run much higher than international ones, hitting consumers and businesses—especially in places like Hawaii and Alaska—with elevated prices for everyday goods. While the law preserves a protected niche for U.S. shipbuilding, it can discourage broader maritime growth and make the sector less agile in a global market.
Facing Reality: The First Step Out of Denial
The 2025 report—detailing just 64 major facilities nationwide, including only eight active shipbuilding yards—lays bare a stark truth: American commercial shipbuilding has withered to near-irrelevance on the world stage, while naval programs struggle under severe capacity limits and chronic delays. The data confirms what many in the industry have long suspected but could never fully prove without official numbers: the situation is far more dire than public rhetoric has acknowledged.The first stage of healing is getting past denial.
For more than two decades, the lack of this annual report allowed policymakers and the public to downplay or ignore the depth of the decline. Now there is no possible way to deny how bad the situation really is. The numbers are in, the gaps are documented, and the consequences—for national security, economic competitiveness, and supply-chain resilience—are impossible to dismiss. Moving forward, consistent annual reporting must become non-negotiable. Only with unflinching transparency can the United States begin the hard work of rebuilding its maritime industrial base before the next strategic crisis forces the issue.