I wrote yesterday how cumbersome bureaucracies and foolish regulations have hindered an effective response to the coronavirus.
This isn’t because governments are run by bad people. Some of them probably are that way, of course, but the real problem is that politicians and bureaucrats are dealing with a perverse incentive system.
They’re largely motivated by power, money, publicity, staffing, and votes.
And that leads to some very unfortunate outcomes, as Betsy McCaughey explained in her syndicated column.
Landing in the hospital on a ventilator is bad. But worse is being told you can’t have one. …learning that the state’s stockpile of medical equipment had 16,000 fewer ventilators than New Yorkers would need in a severe pandemic, Gov. Andrew Cuomo came to a fork in the road in 2015. He could have chosen to buy more ventilators. Instead, he asked his health commissioner, Howard Zucker to assemble a task force and draft rules for rationing the ventilators they already had. …Cuomo could have purchased the additional 16,000 needed ventilators for $36,000 apiece or a total of $576 million in 2015. It’s a lot of money but less than the $750 million he threw away on a boondoggle “Buffalo Billion” solar panel factory.
For what it’s worth, I’m not blaming Governor Cuomo for a failure to buy more ventilators.
In the same situation, I also may have decided that it wasn’t wise to spend $576 million for an event that most people thought was very unlikely.
But I am blaming him for supporting ever-bigger government in New York and getting ever-more involved in things that aren’t legitimate functions of a state government.
And when he expands the size and scope of state government, he increases the likelihood that there won’t be the energy, expertise, or resources to address problems where government should play a role.
Such as dealing with a pandemic.
Which motivates me to unveil a Seventh Theorem of Government.
In addition to the example of Cuomo and ventilators, there’s also a story from Belgiumthat underscores how bloated governments are less capable.
P.S. As suggested by proponents of “state capacity libertarianism,” there is a possible exception to the Seventh Theorem.
Some of the world’s poorest nations have small public sectors – at least according to official measurements. It’s certainly possible, at least in theory, that such countries would benefit if they had larger governments that were capable of providing core public goods.
Indeed, international bureaucracies commonly argue that these countries should increase their tax burdens to provide “financing for development.”
However, the real problem in such nations is rampant corruption, low societal capital, and inadequate rule of law. Which is why it’s not a good idea to generate more money for politicians in those countries.
P.P.S. Here are my other theorems of government.
- The “First Theorem” explains how Washington really operates.
- The “Second Theorem” explains why it is so important to block the creation of new programs.
- The “Third Theorem” explains why centralized programs inevitably waste money.
- The “Fourth Theorem” explains that good policy can be good politics.
- The “Fifth Theorem” explains how good ideas on paper become bad ideas in reality.
- The “Sixth Theorem” explains an under-appreciated benefit of a flat tax.
Daniel J. Mitchell is a public policy economist in Washington. He’s been a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, an economist for Senator Bob Packwood and the Senate Finance Committee, and a Director of Tax and Budget Policy at Citizens for a Sound Economy. His articles can be found in such publications as the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Investor’s Business Daily, and Washington Times. Mitchell holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in economics from the University of Georgia and a Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University. Original article can be viewed here.
Self-Reliance Central publishes a variety of perspectives. Nothing written here is to be construed as representing the views of SRC.