Why Russia attacked: The Backstory You Should Know

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The USA really doesn’t have a dog in this fight, and neither do we at SRC, other than to prevent one more drop of American blood being spilled in the endless wars of Europe. Pax Americana aka the Industrial Military Complex pig trough, is a 20th century hangover and under Trump, the sun appears to be setting on it. NATO is out of control and run by rabid liberals funded by an unthinking USA.

Right now, Russia wants its land back and for Europe to stop encroaching. We must remember that it’s run by a dictator, but he is not currently threatening us. Europe and NATO want to make him our enemy because he is their enemy. We must ask ourselves – is this still the case? Why do we persistently interfere in Ukraine (and other Eastern European countries) when nothing good comes of it.*

This is about to end under Trump. Realpolitik for the US does not involve expansionism, it seeks to bolster the prosperity and happiness of Americans in their own country. Where every penny spent is examined for efficiency and an absence of corruption.

So let’s look at how we arrived at this point.

Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6) 

James Baker III https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early

This is how we got here

Jeffrey Sachs, an American economist and professor at Columbia University, has articulated a detailed perspective on the origins of the current situation in Ukraine, emphasizing the role of U.S. foreign policy and NATO expansion as central provocations leading to the conflict. According to Sachs, the roots of the war trace back to the post-Cold War era, specifically starting in 1990 when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward” if the Soviet Union allowed German unification.

The letter he refers to is heavily reacted in the National Archives.

Despite this assurance, the U.S. pursued an aggressive policy of NATO enlargement, which Sachs views as a deliberate strategy to weaken Russia, driven by neoconservative ideology aimed at maintaining American hegemony.

Sachs highlights key moments in this trajectory: NATO’s expansion began in the 1990s under President Clinton, against the advice of prominent diplomats like George Kennan, who warned it would destabilize relations with Russia. By 2008, at the NATO Bucharest Summit, the U.S. pushed for Ukraine and Georgia to be offered future NATO membership, a move Sachs sees as crossing a critical Russian red line. Then-CIA Director William Burns, serving as U.S. Ambassador to Russia at the time, explicitly cautioned in a 2008 memo titled “Nyet Means Nyet” that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations were perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its security, likely to provoke conflict.

A pivotal event in Sachs’ narrative is the 2014 overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, which he describes as a U.S.-backed regime change operation. Following Yanukovych’s election in 2010 on a platform of neutrality, the U.S. allegedly supported the Maidan uprising, leading to his ouster and the installation of a pro-Western, anti-Russian government. Sachs argues this event ignited a civil war in eastern Ukraine and set the stage for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and, ultimately, the 2022 invasion. He contends that the U.S. ignored Russia’s security concerns, escalated tensions by arming Ukraine, and rejected diplomatic off-ramps, such as the Minsk II agreements, which were never fully implemented.

Sachs asserts that the current war, rather than being an unprovoked Russian aggression as often portrayed in Western media, is the culmination of decades of U.S. provocations, particularly the relentless push for NATO expansion despite repeated Russian objections. He emphasizes that this conflict could have been avoided through diplomacy and respect for Russia’s stated security interests, such as maintaining Ukraine as a neutral buffer state. Instead, he criticizes the U.S. for pursuing a neocon agenda that has devastated Ukraine, cost billions, and brought the world to the brink of nuclear escalation, urging negotiations as the only viable path to peace.

*US interference

Jeffrey Sachs specifically points to key figures in the U.S. government as being behind the 2014 overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, framing it as a U.S.-orchestrated regime change operation. He prominently names Victoria Nuland, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the time, as a central figure in this effort. Sachs highlights her role in actively supporting the Maidan uprising, citing her leaked phone call with then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, where they discussed shaping the post-Yanukovych government, famously including Nuland’s dismissive “F*** the EU” remark regarding European allies’ input. This conversation, intercepted and released in early 2014, is cited by Sachs as evidence of direct U.S. involvement in engineering the coup.

Additionally, Sachs implicates Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine during the Maidan events, as a key player alongside Nuland in coordinating U.S. efforts to back the protests and influence the outcome of Yanukovych’s ouster. He suggests that Pyatt worked in tandem with Nuland to ensure the installation of a pro-Western government aligned with U.S. interests.

Sachs also broadly criticizes the Obama administration, under which these events unfolded, arguing that the operation reflected a broader neoconservative agenda driven by figures like Nuland, who had deep ties to the neocon establishment from her earlier roles under Presidents Bush and Clinton. While he doesn’t always name other specific individuals in every account, Sachs occasionally references the involvement of Senator John McCain, who visited Kyiv during the Maidan protests in December 2013 and publicly expressed solidarity with the demonstrators alongside Senator Chris Murphy, signaling high-level U.S. political support for the movement.

In Sachs’ view, these named individuals—Nuland, Pyatt, and to a lesser extent McCain—represent the visible hands of a U.S. policy that, through the State Department and broader intelligence community, funded and directed the overthrow, leveraging NGOs, opposition groups, and street protests to topple Yanukovych and install a government hostile to Russia.